Hybrid CoE participated in JEF Counter-Hybrid Workshop in Helsinki

Approximately 40 hybrid threat experts from the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) met in Helsinki, Finland on 8–10 March during a workshop on countering hybrid threats. 

The purpose of the workshop was to exchange information between participating nations on the broad-spectrum influencing environment. The relevance of the topic has been underlined by the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The workshop brought together military actors from the JEF countries and the researcher networks of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

“By training and working together with the JEF countries, we will be better prepared to counter hostile broad-spectrum influencing now and in the future, and this will also improve our common security,” stated Director for Strategy and Defence Colonel Sönke Marahrens from Hybrid CoE.

“JEF builds on strong relationships that have been developed between the participants through decades of working together. Through a shared understanding of the increasingly complex security challenges, we can develop the ability to both recognize and operate in an environment with broad-spectrum influencing,” added Major General Janne Jaakkola, Chief of Plans and Policy, Defence Command Finland.

“This JEF Counter-Hybrid Integration Workshop is more important and relevant than ever before. I’m pleased that we’re able to bring together experts from across the JEF nations to discuss and develop our collective counter-hybrid plans and capabilities,” said Standing Joint Force Commander, Major General Jim Morris.

The Joint Expeditionary Force is a multilateral defence cooperation framework led by the United Kingdom, consisting of ten countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The purpose of JEF cooperation is to develop the military readiness of the participating countries and, if necessary, to work together in crisis situations.

Preventing and countering hybrid threats and broad-spectrum influencing has been an important part of JEF cooperation from the start. 

Iceland joins Hybrid CoE

Iceland officially became the 31st Participating State of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats today, as Ambassador of Iceland H.E. Mr Auðunn Atlason handed over the Letter of Notification to Director Teija Tiilikainen at Hybrid CoE’s headquarters in Helsinki.

“Hybrid threats are a complex and constantly evolving security challenge. Close international cooperation is the key to tackling them effectively and in a resilient manner. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and its network of Participating States provide solid analysis and contribute to an enhanced understanding of the nature of hybrid threats. Iceland is confident that joining the Centre will strengthen its ability to counter and respond to hybrid threats, as well as contribute to Iceland´s resilience. We look forward to taking part and contributing to its important work”, Ambassador Atlason said during the ceremony.

“I have the greatest pleasure in welcoming Iceland to join Hybrid CoE. Due to its expertise on the Arctic region and maritime environments, Iceland will make a substantial contribution to the key themes of the Centre”, Teija Tiilikainen stated.

Besides Iceland, the Participating States of the Centre of Excellence include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Centre cooperates closely with the EU and NATO.

‘Seeing red’ – project comparing Russia and China launched

Hybrid CoE launched a comparative actor analysis project called ´Seeing red’ last week in Stockholm. The overall aim is to enhance EU, NATO and Hybrid CoE Participating States’ understanding of Russia and China to better assess, detect and attribute hybrid threat activities before responding.

“Although a body of existing literature focuses on the hybrid threat activities of Russia and China as adversaries of democratic countries, a comparative analysis of the two countries’ strategic cultures and goals, and of their underlying drivers and motives need further attention,” argues Hanna Smith, Research Director at Hybrid CoE. “By providing a coherent discussion on the ways in which Russia and China view influence, threats, and status competition, the project explores ways to identify Russian and Chinese strengths, weaknesses, intents and early warning signs of potential adversarial hybrid threat activity.” In addition to the comparative perspective, the project also looks at potential collaboration between Russia and China in the hybrid threat realm. 

As a central framework for analysis, the project applies a wide range of case studies from Hybrid CoE expert-pool members and other contributors.

The project will contribute to the development of Hybrid CoE actor analysis capabilities, and the findings will be compiled for publication in early 2023.

The event was held physically under the Chatham House Rule, but short interviews with some of the experts will be released on our website within this article and our social media.

Professor Pavel Baev from Peace Research Institute Oslo on what we should expect from Russia in the coming years in the context of hybrid threats.
Director of Swedish Center for China Studies, Jerker Hellström, discusses the importance of China research.
Head of Research Division of Eastern Europe and Eurasia at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Margarete Klein, analyzes the situation and possible scenarios in Ukraine.

Ongoing hybrid threats against the EU and NATO

During their joint visit to Riga, Latvia on Sunday 28 November 2021, NATO Secretary General Mr Jens Stoltenbergand President of the European Commission Ms Ursula von der Leyen met with Directors of NATO Centres of Excellence and Hybrid CoE.

Mr Jaak Tarien, Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Ms Teija Tiilikainen, Director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), and Mr Janis Sarts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, briefed the Secretary General and the President on their work to counter hybrid threats in the Euro-Atlantic region. Below is a short briefing note on the occasion by Hybrid CoE Director Teija Tiilikainen.

Hybrid threat operations are part of the ongoing transition of international power structures. With the current balance of political and military power still favouring Western powers, actors such as Russia, China or Iran use ‘unconventional hybrid methods’ to balance shortcomings in their power arsenal. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the political and societal systems of democratic states, they intend not only to weaken their target states, the EU and NATO, but to undermine the whole democratic model. Democratic values are the key target of hybrid threat activities as they are seen to put regime survival in authoritarian states at risk.

The recent trends of hybrid threat operations include systematic interference in democratic elections and election campaigns by manipulating the information environment (using both social media and traditional media channels), and hacking and leaking targeted information in cyberspace. Recently, cyberattacks against the information systems of Western governments and parliaments have been used to exert psychological pressure against democratic institutions.

Second, vulnerabilities in Western states’ critical infrastructures – stemming from critical sea lines of communication, financial systems, GPS navigation systems or critical supply chains – are being exploited to undermine economic and political stability, and weaken public trust in governments. By supporting the operations with an efficient disinformation campaign, the blame for the ensuing crisis is put on Western governments.

Operations using migration as a political instrument against EU and NATO countries are aimed at the very same goal of discrediting the democratic model and undermining the societal security and stability of Western countries. This instrument, which in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis was used to further amplify the effects of the crisis in Norway and Finland, is currently being used to destabilize the political situation in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and sow disunity within the EU and NATO. Another goal is to deflect attention away from Belarusian human rights violations against its own civil society.

Even hybrid warfare tools are increasingly being used to intensify pressure against Western states and their systems of collective defence. Snap exercises, violations of Western airspace, or processes of unexplained military build-up increase unpredictability and weaken the situational awareness of Western governments. 

Hybrid threat activities require proper policy coordination from EU and NATO members, and solid cooperation between the EU and NATO. The toolboxes of resilience and deterrence should be complemented and made fully operational. The parallel strategy processes – the EU’s Strategic Compass and the New NATO Strategy – provide an excellent opportunity for this. 

The power of cyber in hybrid conflicts explored

On 10 November, Hybrid CoE organized the 3rd Cyber Power Symposium on Hybrid Conflict and Warfare (CPH), gathering together experts from 22 Participating States, the EU and NATO, as well as from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland. 

The participants, representing government, research, and the private sector, discussed how the emergence of new and disruptive cyber technologies will change the reaches of cyber operations. The means to limit or mitigate the exploitation of the cyber domain by hostile actors in hybrid campaigns were also explored, touching upon appropriate cyber-security measures as well as increased resilience and deterrence by the targets.

The symposium’s agenda and work builds on the findings of previous cyber expert-pool meetings and past annual symposiums. On this occasion, the focus was on cyber and new options for hybrid operations in the grey area of interfaces.

Legal resilience debated at Hybrid CoE’s flagship conference in Helsinki

Hybrid CoE held its flagship conference Outside and inside the law: Countering hybrid threats in the legal domain on Thursday 4 November at Pörssitalo, Helsinki. The conference brought together over 130 participants from 24 Participating States, the EU and NATO. The event included three panels with invited speakers elaborating on different aspects of legal resilience in national legislation, international institutions and organizations, and in the field of international law. 

The event was held physically under the Chatham House Rule, but short interviews with some of the conference speakers will be released on our website within this article during the week following the conference.

Dr Aurel Sari, keynote speaker at Hybrid CoE’s flagship conference, explains why it is important to consider law in the context of hybrid threats.
Dr Aurel Sari on future developments to follow in the context of law and lawfare.
Sandra Kalniete on the EU’s toolbox to counter hybrid threats and how it should be developed.
Sandra Kalniete on setting rules on data.
Sandra Kalniete on regulating accountability and transparency of platforms.
Major General Michel Friedling on hybrid threats in the space domain and what law has to do with it.
Major General Michel Friedling on how dependant we are on space.
Merle Maigre on regulating the cyber space within the international community.
Merle Maigre on cooperation in setting international norms and standards for cyber space.
Martijn Rasser on risks involved in dependencies concerning global supply chains.
Martijn Rasser on dangers of using apps like TikTok.

The EU and NATO need a legal threat register to build preparedness, writes Dr Aurel Sari in Hybrid CoE Research Report

As the UK’s HMS Defender sailed some 12 miles (19 kilometres) off Crimea’s coast last July, misinformation and competing accounts of the incident quickly clouded the legal assessment of the situation. Competing legal arguments fed into Russia’s and the United Kingdom’s political narratives, and appeals to the law became heavily politicized.

The HMS Defender incident is an example of real-time hybrid legal threats, where a hostile actor employs law and legal arguments in its tactics as part of an information operation. It illustrates how not all legal vulnerabilities are known in advance, and how this results in an urgent need for legal preparedness and capacity-building, argues Dr Aurel Sari in the new Hybrid CoE Research Report, Hybrid threats and the law: Building legal resilience.

“For actors such as Russia and China, law is a core component of their grand strategy,” Dr Sari writes. “They employ law both to exert control and project influence and to legitimize their acts and delegitimize their opponents.”

Building legal preparedness starts by drawing up a clear picture of the way in which adversaries are known to utilize the law to their advantage. Commonly employed tactics, such as hostile information operations, election interference, building energy and economic dependence to be used later, and cyber operations, all have legal aspects that hostile actors may exploit. The activities and the legal aspects should be categorized into a legal threat matrix and prioritized in the form of a legal threat register.

“The legal threat register should be kept under continuous review in the light of the evolution of the hybrid threat landscape. The register should also identify the legal vulnerabilities that the threats exploit or give rise to,” Dr Sari writes.

In this Hybrid CoE Research Report, Dr Sari shows how navigating the legal threat landscape demands a strategic approach which recognizes the systematic nature of the threat. According to Dr Sari, there are seven steps that the EU, NATO and their member states should take to build this strategic approach.

Read the whole report and its recommendations here.

To lead the discussion on hybrid threats and the law, and to mark the publication of the report, Hybrid CoE is organizing its flagship conference Outside and inside the law: Countering hybrid threats in the legal domain in Helsinki on 4 November. The conference brings together experts, policymakers, practitioners, lawmakers and academics to discuss and enhance legal resilience in and across our societies. Hybrid CoE continues to provide solutions and to share best practices in countering hybrid threats posed by gaps in national legislation and international law.

“The work needs to be done at multiple levels: in the national legislative processes, at the EU level, as well as in the context of international law. A special focus should be on governmental efforts to address hybrid threat attempts below the threshold of open aggression,” says Teija Tiilikainen, Director of Hybrid CoE.

The EU’s Strategic Compass must be adjusted to hybrid threats

The European Union needs a new approach to security and defence due to changes in the Union’s threat environment. For this reason, the EU’s upcoming Strategic Compass needs to take as its starting point the complexity of the threat environment and the pervasiveness and evolutionary nature of hybrid threats, says Rasmus Hindrén, Head of International Relations at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. 

“The ‘hybrid’ in hybrid threats refers to the way that malign actors combine different tools at their disposal and target various domains from information, social and culture to space, cyber, and military domains,” Hindrén writes in his Hybrid CoE Working Paper dealing with the Strategic Compass process. 

There are multiple trends in the security environment that can best be understood under the concept of hybrid threats: a democratization of warfare, exemplified by cyberattack capabilities or drone technology becoming more available to small states and non-state actors, as well as the rapid pace of technological change, especially in the context of emerging and disruptive technologies. In addition, there is a cognitive element involved, as we all try to make sense of the wealth of information, misinformation and disinformation

When one adds to this the fact that the threat environment is characterized by competition – the constant probing of adversaries and potential adversaries, priming them for further actions and operating in the “grey zone” – it becomes clear why the EU needs a new approach. 

According to Hindrén, the primary objective of the Compass should be deterrence against hybrid threats, consisting of both resilience and countermeasures. Resilience ought to be understood in the context of both internal and external security. Countermeasures should be seen as combining both the member states’ and the Commission’s tools: sanctions, diplomatic tools, but also real kinetic capabilities. 

“Kinetic capabilities do not need to be owned or operated by the EU, but they must be integrated into the overall EU approach,” Hindrén says. 

To attain all of this, a greater level of integration within the EU must be achieved, both between internal and external security, as well as between the member states and the EU institutions and agencies. The relationship between the member states and the EU must be further clarified. 

“The member states should see the possibilities that the EU can bring in both enhancing resilience and supplementing the crisis response toolbox,” Hindrén writes. 

The Strategic Compass is a document that aims to clarify the EU’s assessment of the security environment, define the level of ambition in security and defence, and offer concrete tools to achieve that level of ambition. The Compass is set to be finalized during the French presidency of the EU Council in 2022. 

Read the whole Hybrid CoE Working Paper here.

Sönke Marahrens starts as Director of Community of Interest on Strategy & Defence

Colonel Sönke Marahrens takes up the position of Director of Community of Interest on Strategy and Defence (COI S&D) at Hybrid CoE on 1 October 2021. 

Mr Marahrens replaces Dr Johann Schmid, who has worked in this position since the establishment of COI S&D in 2018, and is now moving to a new position outside of the Centre. 

Mr Marahrens is a career Air Force officer, and is moving to Hybrid CoE from his position as Head of Research for Strategy and Armed Forces at the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies in Hamburg. He holds a master’s degree from the Royal Military College in Kingston, Canada, and another from the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg. In addition, he has a full Diploma in Computer Science.

Mr Marahrens has been deployed with NATO to Bosnia and Kosovo, and in 2020 he served as Branch Head for Transition at NATO HQ Resolute Support in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

“I am proud and honoured to join Hybrid CoE, whose members are highly committed to protecting the freedom and rights of European citizens and their friends and allies through research, exploration and new ideas,” Mr Marahrens said.

The Community of Interest on Strategy and Defence focuses on hybrid warfare, related strategies and implications for security policy, the military and defence. It aims at uncovering the essence and nature of hybrid warfare, as well as the logic and pattern of hybrid strategies in order to develop a solid analytical framework as a basis for the assessment of current and future hybrid warfare situations and their practical implications. 

Belgium becomes Hybrid CoE’s 30th Participating State

This morning, Mrs Annelies Verlinden, Belgium’s Minister of the Interior, visited Hybrid CoE to hand over the Letter of Notification to Director Teija Tiilikainen, officially making Belgium the 30th Participating State of the Centre.

“Due to the inherent complexity of hybrid threats, working together at an international level is essential. Belgium is pleased and proud to join the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, and to work together with the Centre and its Participating States in order to enhance its resilience against such threats. We are looking forward to establishing cooperation and a constructive relationship,” stated Mrs Verlinden.

“I have been looking forward to welcoming Belgium as a Participating State as I think we share so many common interests in protecting democratic societies from external interference,” added Hybrid CoE’s Director Teija Tiilikainen. “Belgium can make an important contribution to many of the Centre’s workstrands, so I eagerly anticipate its active engagement in our activities.”

Besides Belgium, the Participating States of the Centre of Excellence include Austria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Centre cooperates closely with the EU and NATO.

Hybrid warfare

Hybrid CoE participated in JEF Counter-Hybrid Workshop in Helsinki

Read ›
Organization (Hybrid CoE)

Iceland joins Hybrid CoE

Read ›
Resilience

‘Seeing red’ – project comparing Russia and China launched

Read ›
EU

Ongoing hybrid threats against the EU and NATO

Read ›
Cyber

The power of cyber in hybrid conflicts explored

Read ›
Resilience

Legal resilience debated at Hybrid CoE’s flagship conference in Helsinki

Read ›
Resilience

The EU and NATO need a legal threat register to build preparedness, writes Dr Aurel Sari in Hybrid CoE Research Report

Read ›
EU

The EU’s Strategic Compass must be adjusted to hybrid threats

Read ›
Organization (Hybrid CoE)

Sönke Marahrens starts as Director of Community of Interest on Strategy & Defence

Read ›
Organization (Hybrid CoE)

Belgium becomes Hybrid CoE’s 30th Participating State

Read ›