Invitation to Jyväskylä Summer School course: ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: Culture and the Changing Nature of War’, 8 –12 August 2022

The University of Jyväskylä (JYU) in cooperation with Hybrid CoE will organize a course on ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: Culture and the Changing Nature of War’ as part of the 31st Jyväskylä Summer School. The course will enhance students’ understanding of how culture expresses the “memory” of the people. Broadly speaking, the course explores how vulnerabilities in the cultural domain can be exploited, as well as how this domain could also contribute to resilience in the sense that culture and diversity can have a protective and immunizing effect against hybrid threats/warfare.


Subjects to be covered: 
– Culture as an indicator of hybrid crisis / hybrid threat / warfare impact (the Kassandra Project) (Brace for Impact) (HYFUTEC)
– Strategic culture: authoritarian strategic culture versus democratic states’ strategic culture versus state-specific strategic culture (R&D)
– “Culture eats strategy for breakfast” – how culture impacts policies and (military) strategies (S&D)
– Culture in the age of information and AI (HYFUTEC) / Cyber “culture” (e.g. disinformation)

Lecturers on the course will include Col (ret) Dr Martti J. Kari (JYU), Dr Hanna Smith and Colonel Sönke Marahrens from Hybrid CoE, as well as a number of guest lecturers.

The course is aimed at master’s students, PhD students, civil servants, as well as military and law enforcement officers with a basic knowledge of hybrid threats. More information about the course can be found HERE. The application period for the Summer School is 1 March – 30 April. Applications can be submitted HERE

For further information, please email jss@jyu.fi

Hybrid CoE continues to work to support European security and Ukraine

While Ukraine is not a Participating State of the Centre, Hybrid CoE has had practical cooperation with the country since the Centre was established in 2017, and contacts have been further strengthened since the start of the war. The Centre has supported Ukrainian exercises and conducts analysis on the situation in the country.

The Centre’s current work concerning Russian aggression and its implications builds on Hybrid CoE’s longstanding research and analysis about Russian hybrid threat operations and strategies, disinformation narratives, as well as its strategic culture. This work will continue as outlined in the Centre’s work plan for 2022. Two recent publications related to Russia’s attack on Ukraine are Russia’s military buildup along Ukraine’s border: What to expect? by Margarete Klein and The Kremlin’s messaging on Ukraine: Authorities and “media” hand in hand’  by Jakub Kalenský. 

Hybrid CoE stands firmly by the values of democracy, an open society, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and continues its work to strengthen its Participating States’ and the whole Euro-Atlantic area’s security. Our work is more important today than ever.

Jakub Kalenský assessing the Kremlin’s ultimate aim in its war in Ukraine. 
Margarete Klein discussing the Kremlin’s ultimate aim in its war in Ukraine.
Jakub Kalenský commenting on the content and effectiveness of Russian disinformation concerning Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Margarete Klein on what to expect from Russia concerning hybrid threats and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Due to its war in Ukraine, Russia may increase its hybrid threat activities in the MENA region

Russia uses a wide spectrum of hybrid threat tools in the Middle East and North Africa, ranging from the domains of culture and diplomacy to intelligence, information and the military. Russia is most active in Libya and Syria. According to the new Hybrid CoE Research Report, Russia’s hybrid threat activities in the MENA region promote its wider strategic goal of gaining a global superpower status, and may be increased due to the war in Ukraine.

With Russia currently being isolated by the West, an increase in military, diplomatic and information operations in Syria could again be anticipated, says Jarno Välimäki, Analyst in the Research and Analysis function at Hybrid CoE and one of the writers of the report.

So far, Russia’s escalating hybrid threat activity in the Syrian civil war has been largely successful, as Russia has become an indispensable player in Syria and, by extension, a major player in the region in general.

“For example, Russia could begin to challenge US air access and block its convoys in Syria. We are also already witnessing Russia trying to pressure the West in the Middle East over the war in Ukraine, as Moscow is threatening to derail the Iran nuclear deal talks due to new sanctions against Russia,” Välimäki says.

Russia’s involvement in post-2011 Libya highlights four main domains of hybrid threat activity: economic, military, political, and diplomatic. Russian activity in Libya has often been opportunistic, taking advantage of dissonant policies by the West.

“Russia’s focus on becoming indispensable, rather than exerting hegemonic control over a single partner, is a cardinal feature of Moscow’s hybrid warfare strategy in Africa,” writes Samuel Ramani in his chapter on Russia’s involvement in Libya.

In this Hybrid CoE Research Report, five writers analyze Russia’s hybrid threat actions through five case studies. The analysis includes the infrastructure, economy, culture, legal, intelligence, diplomacy, political, information, and military domains. In addition to Russia’s actions in Syria and Libya, the other case studies include:

  1. China’s longstanding political and economic ties with Algeria;
  2. Iran’s actions in Lebanon to gain access to the Mediterranean; and
  3. ISIS’s activity in Iraq and Syria and its increased presence in North Africa.

You can download and read Hybrid CoE Research Report 5 in full here.

Hybrid CoE participated in JEF Counter-Hybrid Workshop in Helsinki

Approximately 40 hybrid threat experts from the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) met in Helsinki, Finland on 8–10 March during a workshop on countering hybrid threats. 

The purpose of the workshop was to exchange information between participating nations on the broad-spectrum influencing environment. The relevance of the topic has been underlined by the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The workshop brought together military actors from the JEF countries and the researcher networks of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

“By training and working together with the JEF countries, we will be better prepared to counter hostile broad-spectrum influencing now and in the future, and this will also improve our common security,” stated Director for Strategy and Defence Colonel Sönke Marahrens from Hybrid CoE.

“JEF builds on strong relationships that have been developed between the participants through decades of working together. Through a shared understanding of the increasingly complex security challenges, we can develop the ability to both recognize and operate in an environment with broad-spectrum influencing,” added Major General Janne Jaakkola, Chief of Plans and Policy, Defence Command Finland.

“This JEF Counter-Hybrid Integration Workshop is more important and relevant than ever before. I’m pleased that we’re able to bring together experts from across the JEF nations to discuss and develop our collective counter-hybrid plans and capabilities,” said Standing Joint Force Commander, Major General Jim Morris.

The Joint Expeditionary Force is a multilateral defence cooperation framework led by the United Kingdom, consisting of ten countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The purpose of JEF cooperation is to develop the military readiness of the participating countries and, if necessary, to work together in crisis situations.

Preventing and countering hybrid threats and broad-spectrum influencing has been an important part of JEF cooperation from the start. 

Iceland joins Hybrid CoE

Iceland officially became the 31st Participating State of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats today, as Ambassador of Iceland H.E. Mr Auðunn Atlason handed over the Letter of Notification to Director Teija Tiilikainen at Hybrid CoE’s headquarters in Helsinki.

“Hybrid threats are a complex and constantly evolving security challenge. Close international cooperation is the key to tackling them effectively and in a resilient manner. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and its network of Participating States provide solid analysis and contribute to an enhanced understanding of the nature of hybrid threats. Iceland is confident that joining the Centre will strengthen its ability to counter and respond to hybrid threats, as well as contribute to Iceland´s resilience. We look forward to taking part and contributing to its important work”, Ambassador Atlason said during the ceremony.

“I have the greatest pleasure in welcoming Iceland to join Hybrid CoE. Due to its expertise on the Arctic region and maritime environments, Iceland will make a substantial contribution to the key themes of the Centre”, Teija Tiilikainen stated.

Besides Iceland, the Participating States of the Centre of Excellence include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Centre cooperates closely with the EU and NATO.

‘Seeing red’ – project comparing Russia and China launched

Hybrid CoE launched a comparative actor analysis project called ´Seeing red’ last week in Stockholm. The overall aim is to enhance EU, NATO and Hybrid CoE Participating States’ understanding of Russia and China to better assess, detect and attribute hybrid threat activities before responding.

“Although a body of existing literature focuses on the hybrid threat activities of Russia and China as adversaries of democratic countries, a comparative analysis of the two countries’ strategic cultures and goals, and of their underlying drivers and motives need further attention,” argues Hanna Smith, Research Director at Hybrid CoE. “By providing a coherent discussion on the ways in which Russia and China view influence, threats, and status competition, the project explores ways to identify Russian and Chinese strengths, weaknesses, intents and early warning signs of potential adversarial hybrid threat activity.” In addition to the comparative perspective, the project also looks at potential collaboration between Russia and China in the hybrid threat realm. 

As a central framework for analysis, the project applies a wide range of case studies from Hybrid CoE expert-pool members and other contributors.

The project will contribute to the development of Hybrid CoE actor analysis capabilities, and the findings will be compiled for publication in early 2023.

The event was held physically under the Chatham House Rule, but short interviews with some of the experts will be released on our website within this article and our social media.

Professor Pavel Baev from Peace Research Institute Oslo on what we should expect from Russia in the coming years in the context of hybrid threats.
Director of Swedish Center for China Studies, Jerker Hellström, discusses the importance of China research.
Head of Research Division of Eastern Europe and Eurasia at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Margarete Klein, analyzes the situation and possible scenarios in Ukraine.

Ongoing hybrid threats against the EU and NATO

During their joint visit to Riga, Latvia on Sunday 28 November 2021, NATO Secretary General Mr Jens Stoltenbergand President of the European Commission Ms Ursula von der Leyen met with Directors of NATO Centres of Excellence and Hybrid CoE.

Mr Jaak Tarien, Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Ms Teija Tiilikainen, Director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), and Mr Janis Sarts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, briefed the Secretary General and the President on their work to counter hybrid threats in the Euro-Atlantic region. Below is a short briefing note on the occasion by Hybrid CoE Director Teija Tiilikainen.

Hybrid threat operations are part of the ongoing transition of international power structures. With the current balance of political and military power still favouring Western powers, actors such as Russia, China or Iran use ‘unconventional hybrid methods’ to balance shortcomings in their power arsenal. By exploiting vulnerabilities in the political and societal systems of democratic states, they intend not only to weaken their target states, the EU and NATO, but to undermine the whole democratic model. Democratic values are the key target of hybrid threat activities as they are seen to put regime survival in authoritarian states at risk.

The recent trends of hybrid threat operations include systematic interference in democratic elections and election campaigns by manipulating the information environment (using both social media and traditional media channels), and hacking and leaking targeted information in cyberspace. Recently, cyberattacks against the information systems of Western governments and parliaments have been used to exert psychological pressure against democratic institutions.

Second, vulnerabilities in Western states’ critical infrastructures – stemming from critical sea lines of communication, financial systems, GPS navigation systems or critical supply chains – are being exploited to undermine economic and political stability, and weaken public trust in governments. By supporting the operations with an efficient disinformation campaign, the blame for the ensuing crisis is put on Western governments.

Operations using migration as a political instrument against EU and NATO countries are aimed at the very same goal of discrediting the democratic model and undermining the societal security and stability of Western countries. This instrument, which in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis was used to further amplify the effects of the crisis in Norway and Finland, is currently being used to destabilize the political situation in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and sow disunity within the EU and NATO. Another goal is to deflect attention away from Belarusian human rights violations against its own civil society.

Even hybrid warfare tools are increasingly being used to intensify pressure against Western states and their systems of collective defence. Snap exercises, violations of Western airspace, or processes of unexplained military build-up increase unpredictability and weaken the situational awareness of Western governments. 

Hybrid threat activities require proper policy coordination from EU and NATO members, and solid cooperation between the EU and NATO. The toolboxes of resilience and deterrence should be complemented and made fully operational. The parallel strategy processes – the EU’s Strategic Compass and the New NATO Strategy – provide an excellent opportunity for this. 

The power of cyber in hybrid conflicts explored

On 10 November, Hybrid CoE organized the 3rd Cyber Power Symposium on Hybrid Conflict and Warfare (CPH), gathering together experts from 22 Participating States, the EU and NATO, as well as from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland. 

The participants, representing government, research, and the private sector, discussed how the emergence of new and disruptive cyber technologies will change the reaches of cyber operations. The means to limit or mitigate the exploitation of the cyber domain by hostile actors in hybrid campaigns were also explored, touching upon appropriate cyber-security measures as well as increased resilience and deterrence by the targets.

The symposium’s agenda and work builds on the findings of previous cyber expert-pool meetings and past annual symposiums. On this occasion, the focus was on cyber and new options for hybrid operations in the grey area of interfaces.

Legal resilience debated at Hybrid CoE’s flagship conference in Helsinki

Hybrid CoE held its flagship conference Outside and inside the law: Countering hybrid threats in the legal domain on Thursday 4 November at Pörssitalo, Helsinki. The conference brought together over 130 participants from 24 Participating States, the EU and NATO. The event included three panels with invited speakers elaborating on different aspects of legal resilience in national legislation, international institutions and organizations, and in the field of international law. 

The event was held physically under the Chatham House Rule, but short interviews with some of the conference speakers will be released on our website within this article during the week following the conference.

Dr Aurel Sari, keynote speaker at Hybrid CoE’s flagship conference, explains why it is important to consider law in the context of hybrid threats.
Dr Aurel Sari on future developments to follow in the context of law and lawfare.
Sandra Kalniete on the EU’s toolbox to counter hybrid threats and how it should be developed.
Sandra Kalniete on setting rules on data.
Sandra Kalniete on regulating accountability and transparency of platforms.
Major General Michel Friedling on hybrid threats in the space domain and what law has to do with it.
Major General Michel Friedling on how dependant we are on space.
Merle Maigre on regulating the cyber space within the international community.
Merle Maigre on cooperation in setting international norms and standards for cyber space.
Martijn Rasser on risks involved in dependencies concerning global supply chains.
Martijn Rasser on dangers of using apps like TikTok.

The EU and NATO need a legal threat register to build preparedness, writes Dr Aurel Sari in Hybrid CoE Research Report

As the UK’s HMS Defender sailed some 12 miles (19 kilometres) off Crimea’s coast last July, misinformation and competing accounts of the incident quickly clouded the legal assessment of the situation. Competing legal arguments fed into Russia’s and the United Kingdom’s political narratives, and appeals to the law became heavily politicized.

The HMS Defender incident is an example of real-time hybrid legal threats, where a hostile actor employs law and legal arguments in its tactics as part of an information operation. It illustrates how not all legal vulnerabilities are known in advance, and how this results in an urgent need for legal preparedness and capacity-building, argues Dr Aurel Sari in the new Hybrid CoE Research Report, Hybrid threats and the law: Building legal resilience.

“For actors such as Russia and China, law is a core component of their grand strategy,” Dr Sari writes. “They employ law both to exert control and project influence and to legitimize their acts and delegitimize their opponents.”

Building legal preparedness starts by drawing up a clear picture of the way in which adversaries are known to utilize the law to their advantage. Commonly employed tactics, such as hostile information operations, election interference, building energy and economic dependence to be used later, and cyber operations, all have legal aspects that hostile actors may exploit. The activities and the legal aspects should be categorized into a legal threat matrix and prioritized in the form of a legal threat register.

“The legal threat register should be kept under continuous review in the light of the evolution of the hybrid threat landscape. The register should also identify the legal vulnerabilities that the threats exploit or give rise to,” Dr Sari writes.

In this Hybrid CoE Research Report, Dr Sari shows how navigating the legal threat landscape demands a strategic approach which recognizes the systematic nature of the threat. According to Dr Sari, there are seven steps that the EU, NATO and their member states should take to build this strategic approach.

Read the whole report and its recommendations here.

To lead the discussion on hybrid threats and the law, and to mark the publication of the report, Hybrid CoE is organizing its flagship conference Outside and inside the law: Countering hybrid threats in the legal domain in Helsinki on 4 November. The conference brings together experts, policymakers, practitioners, lawmakers and academics to discuss and enhance legal resilience in and across our societies. Hybrid CoE continues to provide solutions and to share best practices in countering hybrid threats posed by gaps in national legislation and international law.

“The work needs to be done at multiple levels: in the national legislative processes, at the EU level, as well as in the context of international law. A special focus should be on governmental efforts to address hybrid threat attempts below the threshold of open aggression,” says Teija Tiilikainen, Director of Hybrid CoE.

Hybrid warfare

Invitation to Jyväskylä Summer School course: ‘The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: Culture and the Changing Nature of War’, 8 –12 August 2022

Read ›
Illustration of the tensions between Ukraine Russia and the European Union
Hybrid warfare

Hybrid CoE continues to work to support European security and Ukraine

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MENA

Due to its war in Ukraine, Russia may increase its hybrid threat activities in the MENA region

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Hybrid warfare

Hybrid CoE participated in JEF Counter-Hybrid Workshop in Helsinki

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Organization (Hybrid CoE)

Iceland joins Hybrid CoE

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Resilience

‘Seeing red’ – project comparing Russia and China launched

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EU

Ongoing hybrid threats against the EU and NATO

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Cyber

The power of cyber in hybrid conflicts explored

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Resilience

Legal resilience debated at Hybrid CoE’s flagship conference in Helsinki

Read ›
Resilience

The EU and NATO need a legal threat register to build preparedness, writes Dr Aurel Sari in Hybrid CoE Research Report

Read ›