News Archive - Page 3 of 16 - Hybrid CoE - The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

Paul Taylor speaking while the other members of the 'Combatting Disinformation' panel on the stage are Hanna Linderstål and Chris Kremidas Courtney.

December 2, 2022

News media in focus in the third Countering Disinformation Wargame event

Teams from five Participating States, the EU and NATO, together with countering disinformation experts and journalists, gathered in Brussels this week with the aim of enhancing capacities to counter disinformation. The third Countering Disinformation Wargame (CDWG) event consisted of a one-day conference, ‘Demystifying Disinformation’, and a countering disinformation wargame exercise.

The conference provided a deep dive into disinformation as a phenomenon in today’s complex information environment. The expert addresses and two panel discussions explored the characteristics and actors behind disinformation, as well as ways to counter it.

In his keynote speech, Jamie Fly, President and CEO of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, emphasized the key role that a free press plays in democracies, despite the fact that independent media outlets are struggling today. Mr Fly also stated that the fragmented information environment, together with eroding trust, creates room for malign influence and disinformation.

“How can quality journalism work to counter disinformation and defend democracy?” was the question posed by Paul Taylor, Contributing Editor from POLITICO Europe. “By just doing its job, being there on the ground,” he answered, emphasizing the utmost importance of cross-checking sources.

By simulating real-world scenarios, the aim of the wargame exercise was to raise awareness of disinformation and offer participants the opportunity to practise the best approaches to recognizing, responding to, and defending against disinformation.

“Russia’s war in Ukraine and its disinformation activities around the world have heightened the importance of countering disinformation wargaming today. Our wargame scenarios reflect the Kremlin’s real-life intentions to use energy and food as weapons, and to use disinformation on these topics to sow distrust and division among democratic societies,” Hybrid CoE’s Director for Training & Exercises Shiho Rybski said. “Hybrid CoE will continue to train its Participating States, the EU and NATO in countering disinformation through wargaming in the future as well.”

The event was the last in the series funded by the US Global Engagement Center. The Brussels event was organized in cooperation with Friends of Europe.

November 1, 2022

Director of Research and Analysis Hanna Smith appointed to OSCE

The Director of Hybrid CoE’s Research and Analysis function, Dr Hanna Smith, has been appointed as Senior Strategic Advisor to the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) from 1 November 2022. The position is based in Vienna, Austria.

Hanna leaves Hybrid CoE after being with the Centre for five years.

“As one of the leading experts on Russia in Finland, Hanna has played a key role during the early years of Hybrid CoE by providing the Centre with her expertise and strong academic networks,” Director Teija Tiilikainen said.

“We’ll miss Hanna’s energy, her fresh and innovative ideas and her solid expertise. On behalf of the entire Hybrid CoE community, I’d like to thank her for these five important years at the Centre.”

More information: hanna.smith@osce.org

October 17, 2022

The 4th Cyber Power Symposium on Hybrid Conflict and Warfare

On 13 October, the 4^th Cyber Power Symposium on Hybrid Conflict and Warfare (CPH) gathered together experts from 27 Hybrid CoE Participating States, the EU and NATO, as well as from Australia, Japan, Ukraine and Switzerland. The focus of the event was on hybrid and cyber aspects of cognitive warfare. Various questions were addressed during the event, such as: Is cognitive warfare equivalent to information warfare, or broader like cyber warfare, and what are their differences? Can cognitive warfare be countered by means of cyber defence, or do we need an additional cognitive defence with cyber elements? How are instruments of cognitive warfare combined with other hybrid threat instruments in operations against Western societies?

To sum up the discussions of the day, it was agreed that in the era of cyber warfare it is also essential to understand the effects of cognitive warfare. Adversaries are intent upon influencing us and our thinking to penetrate decision-making circles, whether focused on energy-related decisions, applying for NATO membership, or something else. It also means that economic and national security are now two sides of the same coin. To destabilize democratic states, hybrid threats are employed in cyber operations, information warfare, cyber-enabled disinformation operations, foreign direct investment, as well as in social media to manipulate large numbers of people. Sovereignty will duly take on a new meaning. As a consequence, not only land borders have to be defended but also the cyber and information space, as well as the control of data.

September 28, 2022

Malta joins Hybrid CoE

Mr Jori Arvonen, Chairman of Hybrid CoE’s Board, received a notification today regarding Malta’s participation in the Memorandum of Understanding of Hybrid CoE, officially making the country a Participating State of the Centre.

“It is my great pleasure to welcome Malta as the 32^nd Participating State of Hybrid CoE. Malta has already been active towards the Centre before joining and I look forward to the country’s contributions to Hybrid CoE’s work in many areas, including economic and maritime issues,” said Mr Arvonen.

“In the complex multi-polar world, Malta recognizes that security challenges are on the rise, and can only be addressed jointly with like-minded partners. In this regard, acknowledging the complexity of hybrid threats, Malta is proud to join the other 31 Participating States in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. We look forward to our experts working together with the Centre’s networks in order to increase Europe’s resilience to hybrid threats. As an island state in the Mediterranean, Malta is willing to contribute its expertise in the southern neighbourhood and is always ready to offer neutral ground for diplomacy,” affirmed Mr Byron Camilleri, Minister for Home Affairs, Security, Reforms and Equality of Malta.

Besides Malta, the Participating States of the Centre of Excellence include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Centre cooperates closely with the EU and NATO.

September 20, 2022

Pilot course launched on cyber elements in hybrid conflict

A novel pilot course entitled “The Contribution of Cyber in Hybrid Conflict” was organized at Hybrid CoE premises in Helsinki on 12–16 September, with participation by 34 experts from 14 countries, the EU and NATO.

The objective of the pilot course was to educate participants about key elements of cyber defence and hybrid threats, and to provide them with individual training to enable them to address the implications of the nexus of cyber and hybrid. While applicable in a wide range of environments, the course focus was set to explicitly address implications in military operations. The course also provided participants with opportunities for networking and intellectual cross-fertilization.

During the first two days of the course, theoretical content about similarities and differences between cyber and hybrid threats and how to respond to them was presented and discussed. Starting on the third day of the course, the participants were divided into groups and assigned roles to act as representatives of a fictional nation or international organization in a decision-making exercise. The purpose of the exercise was to provide the participants with an opportunity to practically apply the theoretically acquired knowledge in a simulated malicious environment.

The course concluded with a debriefing session on the exercise and closed with a ceremony in which the course certificates were handed out. The course was designed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), and supported by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The course programme included overviews of Hybrid CoE’s and the CCDCOE’s working programmes, as well as an explanation of the differences and similarities between cyber and hybrid threats.

August 26, 2022

US NPS wargaming course returns to Helsinki

In August, the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), together with Hybrid CoE, conducted a wargaming course on hybrid threats in support of the Centre’s Participating States. This was the second time that such a course had been organized, with wargames created and conducted to train participants’ strategic thinking in the context of hybrid threat scenarios.

Representing six Participating States, NATO, various national ministries, think tanks and armed forces, thecourse brought together a unique group of students in Helsinki. Aimed at a diverse group of participants, thispractical and educational two-week workshop was designed to encourage a whole-of-society approach to cooperation in countering hybrid threats. In this iteration of the wargaming course, students tackled the challenge of building an exploratory wargame which considered the influence of various actors on European energy security.

The students went through the process of creating a wargame from start to finish, with the help of lectures, practical exercises and learning by doing. Through the creation of unique hybrid threat wargames, the courses not only increased awareness of hybrid threats but also overall understanding with regard to nations’ ability to respond to them.

August 2, 2022

Attribution of information influence operations is broken – this is how to fix it, suggests a new publication by NATO StratCom COE and Hybrid CoE

Digital platforms are vulnerable to manipulation: Since 2018, the big three platforms – Google/YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter – have announced over 350 takedowns of coordinated efforts at manipulation. Such takedowns usually involve attribution, a statement of blame towards the actors behind the information influence operation (IIO).

However, attribution of information influence operations is dysfunctional, claim James Pamment and Victoria Smith, the authors of a new study published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

According to the study, a typical platform takedown makes a statement of attribution but rarely shares the evidence that led to that conclusion. Hence, the study aims to improve the ability of practitioners to collect and analyse evidence in support of the attribution process.

To this end, the authors offer an attribution framework consisting of the types of evidence available through different kinds of data.

Attribution can be based on four types of evidence:

Technical evidence (the observable traces that an adversary leaves behind at the level of digital signals)
Behavioural evidence (knowledge of the tools, techniques and procedures (TTPs) by which adversaries carry out their work)
Contextual evidence (an assessment of the content and the socio-political context of the IIO and the motivations of the adversary)
A legal & ethical assessment (as to whether assigning blame is proportionate, and whether it sets into motion considerations relating to e.g. political or commercial fallout, treaties or litigation)

The evidence may be derived from three kinds of data:

Open source (open-source information and intelligence, OSINT)
Proprietary source (based on privileged backend data sources such as those available to digital platforms, private intelligence and cyber security companies)
Classified source (based on secret information primarily held by governments and the military)

The study aims to improve understanding between actors about the benefits and weaknesses of the different types of information available to different actors, and to use this understanding to improve information-sharing within the IIO community (journalists, researchers, NGOs, companies, intergovernmental organizations, and governments).

According to the authors, the clearest areas of collaboration seem to be around behavioural, contextual, and legal-ethical assessments.

“If the holders of classified and proprietary technical and behavioural evidence want to present their attributions as the most apolitical and objective assessments possible, they need open-source researchers to get better at what they do. This is only possible with a firm commitment to information-sharing, transparency, and honesty,” the authors write.

You can download and read the study entitled Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online on NATO StratCom COE’s website.

The work on attribution at Hybrid CoE is led and coordinated by the Community of Interest on Hybrid Influence. You can read more about its work on our website.

June 29, 2022

National exercise with a focus on hybrid threats piloted in Austria

Hybrid CoE has developed an exercise to foster nationwide awareness of hybrid threats; to demonstrate the need for nationwide cooperation in countering them; and to look at existing structures and processes within the framework of the national Crisis Management Systems and interministerial working groups.

This national decision-making tabletop exercise (TTX) with a focus on hybrid threats was piloted on 14 June in Austria, the country which originally proposed that the Centre could develop this type of exercise. The exercise was designed from the outset with the intention of also making it available to other Participating States in order to develop a whole-of-government/-society approach based on existing national crisis management systems for countering hybrid threats/attacks.

The TTX consisted of two parts. Phase one was targeted at working-level practitioners, whereas the nationwide political decision-making process with the involvement of strategic-level participants from all ministries was at the core of phase two. Injects ranged from terrorist and cyber attacks, challenges regarding critical infrastructure, disinformation related to the health sector, the use of proxies, and instrumentalized migration. These challenges taught the ministries the importance of cross-government communication when faced with hybrid attacks. The results of the national exercise will only be relayed to the respective governments.

“Hybrid CoE is grateful for the opportunity to test this national exercise with the Austrian government. We hope to further refine this product so that Hybrid CoE can make this programme a permanent part of the training catalogue,” said Shiho Rybski, Hybrid CoE’s Training and Exercises Director.

Source: Babaroga / shutterstock.com

June 9, 2022

From private corporations to religious institutions – Hybrid CoE’s taxonomy of non-state hybrid threat actors

Russia has been making vigorous efforts to infiltrate Western political movements and civil society networks, for example through wealthy individuals and foundations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. Similarly, China has worked hard to implement the United Front approach, through which the Chinese Communist Party seeks to induce diaspora organizations, foreign business, academic associations, political parties and individual influencers to carry out its will across the globe, while maintaining nominal deniability.

Both the Russian and Chinese efforts are examples of how states use non-state actors (NSAs) in their hybrid threat activities. Non-state actors range from individuals to private corporations, religious institutions, humanitarian organizations, armed groups and de facto regimes in actual control of territory and populations. Non-state actors play a crucial role in the hybrid threat landscape. However, there is no agreed definition of the concept itself.

Hybrid CoE’s new research has produced a taxonomy of NSAs, providing practitioners and decision-makers with a tool to detect potential hybrid threats posed by non-state actors.

The taxonomy is built around the operational capacities that NSAs may possess, and the types of relationship they may have with a state sponsor:

Hybrid threat activities through non-state actor clients

According to the new research, the role played by NSAs in the context of hybrid threats is likely to continue to gain importance, as the variety of NSAs suited to such a role is likely to increase.

“It is vital to listen to practitioners so that the toolbox for detecting and countering NSAs engaged in hybrid threat activities is as effective as possible,” said Janne Jokinen, Deputy Director of the Community of Interest on Hybrid Influence and one of the authors of the new study. “A key element in this discussion should be the collaboration between public authorities and private actors, including civil society organizations, private enterprise, and the population at large.”

Access and download the full Hybrid CoE Research Report 6: Hybrid threats from non-state actors: A taxonomy.
Read more about Hybrid CoE’s work on non-state actors.

May 27, 2022

Real-world simulations teach how to defend against disinformation: Hybrid CoE organized the Helsinki Countering Disinformation Wargame

Policymakers, journalists, media influencers, and experts from the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats gathered in Helsinki 23-27 May for the Helsinki Countering Disinformation Wargame (CDWG). This was a series of events that seek to build the capacities of Hybrid CoE’s 31 Participating States and their populations to counter disinformation through the development and implementation of two wargame simulations and a boardgame. The events will lead to the further development of tools and techniques to help counter disinformation, and will include strategic communications strategies.

“By simulating real-world scenarios we raise awareness of disinformation and offer participants the opportunity to practise the best approaches to recognizing, responding to, and defending against disinformation,” said Ms Shiho Rybski, Director of Training & Exercises at Hybrid CoE.

The Helsinki Countering Disinformation Wargame consisted of three parts: First, a one-day conference titled Demystifying disinformation was organized on Monday 23 May in a physical and virtual format. Second, on Tuesday and Wednesday, national teams from Hybrid CoE’s Participating States practised their skills in countering disinformation in a two-day virtual wargame connecting the capital cities with the Helsinki-based control cell. Day one focused on Russian disinformation, day two on Chinese disinformation.

Finally, on Friday 27 May, two half-day boardgame events were organized, where university students were able to play a physical boardgame – entitled Malign – developed in cooperation with the Georgetown University Wargaming Society and Hybrid CoE. The card-driven educational boardgame is designed to help players better understand, detect, and deter disinformation.

The CDWG project is funded by the U.S. Global Engagement Center. The project endeavours to develop and implement a physical boardgame on disinformation for university students and Hybrid CoE’s Participating States. The project also seeks to design and implement a virtual wargame on disinformation to be made available to Hybrid CoE’s Participating States, tailored to their needs and hybrid threat landscapes.

[For more information, please contact:
Shiho Rybski, Director, Training & Exercises, shiho.rybski@hybridcoe.fi]